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UNITED STATES v. NEW MEXICO: THE
BEGINNING OF A TREND TOWARD
FAVORING STATE WATER RIGHTS OVER
FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
In United States v. New Mexico,' the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the United States did not reserve water under the
implied reservation doctrine for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, wildlife preservation or cattle grazing purposes in the Gila
National Forest. In so ruling, the court limited the purposes for
which the Gila National Forest was established to two, namely "to
preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for private and
public uses under state law." 2 The result of the decision will be to
give additional strength to state water rights by narrowly construing
the federal water right.
The controversy in United States v. New Mexico initially arose as a
private action to enjoin the alleged illegal diversions of the Rio Mimbres River. In 1970, the State of New Mexico filed a complaint-inintervention to seek a general adjudication of the water rights in the
Rio Mimbres and its tributaries. The United States was joined as a
party because it claimed reserved water rights for use in the Gila
National Forest through which the Rio Mimbres runs. The state district court ruled that Congress, in segregating the Gila National Forest from other public lands, had reserved enough water to fulfill the
purposes for which it was set aside. The district court, however, held
that these purposes did not include recreation, aesthetics, wildlife
preservation, or cattle grazing. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme
Court affirmed.' Certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court.4
Writing for a majority of five,' Justice Rehnquist maintained that
the United States may reserve only the amount of water necessary to
fulfill the purposes for which a federal reservation is created. The
issue, then, was what amount of water, if any, did Congress intend to
1. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
2. Id. at 718.
3. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977). See
Note, National Forests Do Not Have Reserved Water Rights for Recreational Purposes, 18
Nat. Res. J. 423 (1978).
4. 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
5. Included in the majority are Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Burger.
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reserve for use in the national forests. To determine the purposes for
which the national forests were established the Court construed the
Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897.6 The Act states:
No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States.7

From the language of the Act and its legislative history, the Court
determined that the national forests were reserved for only two purposes: "to conserve the water flows and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the people." ' The Court also concluded that
"[niational forests were not to be reserved for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife-preservation purposes." 9

Justice Powell dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall. The dissenting Justices interpreted the Organic
Act in a way differing from the majority's interpretation. They urged
that a natural reading of the language in the Organic Act indicated
that wildlife-preservation was one of the purposes for the national
forests. The dissenters maintained that the effect of the majority
opinion was to severely limit the amount of water available to the
federal government by restricting the application of the federal law
of implied reservation.
Historically, the states and the federal government have struggled
over whose water law shall apply to federal lands. The struggle has
taken place in the West where the predominant water law is antithetical to the federal law and where most of the large federal reservations
are situated. In general, the Western states allocate water on the basis
of prior appropriation-that is, the past use of a specific quantity of
water entitles the user to the continued use of that amount. On the
other hand, under the federal implied reservation doctrine, the federal government has reserved unspecified amounts of water for future
use on its lands. The two systems ultimately collide in the arid West
when the federal government attempts to appropriate, under the
implied reservation doctrine, water for a new use from a stream
which already is over-appropriated under the state system of prior
appropriation. In cases prior to United States v. New Mexico the
Supreme Court tended to give the federal right greater weight in
6.
7.
8.
9.

30 Stat. 34, 36, 16 U.S.C. § § 473 to 482, 551 (1976).
30 Stat. 35, as amended 16 U.S.C. § 475.
438 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 708.
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resolving disputes.1" The decisions of the Supreme Court in United
States v. New Mexico and its companion case, California v. United
States,' 1 indicate, however, that the Court is shifting to a position
favoring the application of state water law even to federal reservations.
The implied reservation doctrine was first developed in Winters v.
United States.1 2 In that case, an action was brought by the United
States to restrain appellants from building a dam in the Milk River in
what is now the State of Montana. Construction of the dam would
have inhibited the flow of the river to the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation. The Supreme Court held that the federal government
could reserve water for the Indian reservation and exempt it from the
appropriation requirement of state law. The Court also held that the
priority date of the reservation was the date the Indian reservation
was established, rather than the date the Indians first made beneficial
use of the water. Thus, the Court recognized the federal power to
reserve state water, at least for Indian reservations.
The implied reservation doctrine relied on in the Winters case was
later applied in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, the so-called
Pelton Dam case." 3 In that case the Federal Power Commission had
issued a license for construction of a hydroelectric plant on federal
lands bordering on the Deschutes River in Oregon. The power of the
commission to issue such a license was challenged by the State of
Oregon. The Court held that the commission could grant the license
for "the use of the water [when it] does not conflict with the vested
rights of others." 1 4 The Court rejected the argument made by Oregon that the Desert Land Act of 1877' 1 and related acts constituted
an express congressional delegation of authority to the state of the
power to regulate the use of its own waters.' 6 The result of the case
was that the federal government could sanction the building of a dam
and the corresponding use of water without the state's consent.
The strongest indication of the Court's federal rights stance was
evinced in Arizona v. California.' I The basic issue of the case concerned the amount of water from the Colorado River to which New
Mexico, California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and the United States
10. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128
(1976).
11. 438 U.S. 645.
12. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
13. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
14. Id. at 445.
15. 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).

16. 349 U.S. at 447.
17. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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were entitled. The United States asserted a reserved right for use of
water on an Indian reservation, in the national forests, recreational
and wildlife areas, and other government lands. With respect to the
claims made by the United States on behalf of the Indian reservation,
the Court relied on the Winters case to hold that, by the implied
reservation doctrine, water rights were reserved at the time the Indian reservation was created. As to the claims concerning the national forests, the Court agreed with a Master's finding that the
national forests had been established for five purposes:
(1) the protection of watersheds and the maintenance of natural
flow in streams below the sheds; (2) production of timber; (3) production of forage for domestic animals; (4) protection and propagation of wildlife; and (5) recreation for the general public.1 8
To arrive at its decision, the Court relied on the United States Constitution and stated: "We have no doubt about the power of the United
States under these clauses [Property Clause and Commerce Clause]
to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property."' 9
The Court again addressed the federal rights question in Cappaert
v. United States.20 The issue in the case was whether the implied
reservation doctrine applied to a national monument at Devil's Hole.
The Court held that when the federal government withdraws land
from the public domain it reserves sufficient water then unappropriated to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. 2' The Court
decided that when the federal government reserved the land around
Devil's Hole it also reserved enough unappropriated water "to maintain the level of the pool to preserve its scientific value .... "2 2 This
decision was based on a finding that the preservation of conditions of
scientific interest was one of the purposes for the establishment of
Devil's Hole Monument.
Until United States v. New Mexico, the tendency of the United
States Supreme Court had been to favor the federal claim of implied
reservation over a claim based on state law. In United States v. New
18. S. Rifkind, Special Master Report 96 (1960).
19. 373 U.S. at 598.

20. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
21. The Court in its decision gives a very succinct definition of implied reservation:
when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation
and is superior to the rights of future appropriators.
426 U.S. at 138.
22. 426 U.S. at 147.
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Mexico the Court narrowly construed the purposes for which the
Gila National Forest was established and hence for which water was
impliedly reserved. In so doing, the Court implicitly overruled dicta
in Arizona v. California2 3 which had broadly construed the purposes
of the national forests. If the Court had followed its previous trend,
it would have broadly construed the purposes for which the Gila
National Forest was established and concluded that aesthetics, wildlife and recreation were among those purposes. Because of the
Court's decision, the federal government will need to perfect water
rights under the state law of prior appropriation if it wishes to use
water for aesthetic, wildlife and recreation purposes in the Gila
National Forest.
A further indication of the Court's change in position is seen in
the case of California v. United States,2" which was decided the
same day as United States v. New Mexico. The question presented to
the Court was whether the Reclamation Act of 19022 5 allowed a
state to require the reclamation projects authorized by Congress in
that state conform to state law.2 6 In construing section eight of the
Act, the Court held that a state could impose conditions on the
"control, appropriation, use or distribution of water ' 2 7 which were
not inconsistent with the congressional directive regarding the reclamation project. The state of California, therefore, has some control
over the use of its water when that water is used in a federal program.

CONCLUSION
The change in the Supreme Court's position on the reservation of
water rights has a potentially dramatic effect on existing federal
reservations. Henceforth, the United States will need to perfect its
water rights on federal reservations according to state law whenever a
given water usage does not fall within one of the narrowly defined
purposes of the reservation. The effect will be harsh in the West
where the dominant water law is that of prior appropriation. 2 s Most
23. 373 U.S. at 595.
24. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
25. 32 Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C. § § 372, 383 (1976).
26. 348 U.S. at 647.
27. Id. at 675.
28. The law of prior appropriation provides that a right to water is created by putting the
water to beneficial use. There are two views on the use of prior appropriation. In Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming the law of prior
appropriation is the only water law. In California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Washington the law of prior appropriation is used
in conjunction with a riparian water system. See Ellis, Water Rights: What They Are and
How They Are Created, 13 Rocky Mtn. Min. L Inst. 451 (1967).
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streams in the West are already over-appropriated and so new claims
on water can rarely be allowed. 2 I The only technique for the acquisition of water rights when a stream is over-appropriated is through
the purchase of an existing water right. Following United States v.
New Mexico, if the Department of Interior wants water in the
national forests for other than maintenance of timber or watersheds,
it will have to purchase existing water rights. Those water users who
have a legal right under the law of prior appropriation to a certain
amount of water will not need to worry about losing that supply to
the United States. This assurance of a water supply will lead to
higher purchase prices for existing water rights.
Unanswered by United States v. New Mexico is what rights holders
of valid grazing permits in the Gila National Forest possess since the
Supreme Court has stated that water has not been reserved for this
purpose under the implied reservation doctrine. Furthermore, one
may inquire as to the significance of this decision as applied to the
Gila National Forest since the Rio Mimbres originates in the forest.
The fact that the Rio Mimbres originates there guarantees that the
aesthetics and wildlife preservation purposes can be fulfilled without
express reservation.
GERALD VELARDE

29. Id at 452.

